Income inequality increased in Sweden during the 1980's and 90's. This increase was due to changes in the upper end of the wage distribution and included an increase in the returns to higher education. This paper argues that the increase in income inequality between high and low skilled workers was demand driven and was due to the presence of capital-skill complementarity in production. Increased investments in new, more efficient capital equipment, together with a slowdown in the growth rate of skilled labor, raised the ratio of effective capital inputs per skilled worker, which, in turn, increased the relative demand (and market return) for skilled labor through the capitalskill complementarity mechanism.
In Sweden, the university wage premium for full-time workers estimated using the Swedish Level of Living Survey rose by 13 percent between 1991 and 2000. 3 Statistics Sweden reports that the university wage premium for white-collar males This question will be examined using a neoclassical growth framework based on recent work by Krusell, Ohanian, Ríos-Rull and Violante (2000) (hereafter KORV).
Their influential study proposes an explanation of the even more dramatic rise in the university wage premium experienced in the United States. They argue that the falling relative price of capital equipment (due to equipment-specific technological change) has led to increased investment and, subsequently, to an increase in the ratio of capital equipment per skilled worker in the economy. This raises the market 1 P90 and P10 stand for the 90th and 10th percentiles of the distribution of logged wages. 2 See Katz and Autor (1999) for an overview of this literature. 3 Author's estimate as reported in Section 3. return to higher education (and other measures of skills) through the capital-skill complementarity mechanism. 4 The purpose of this study is to determine whether or not the capital-skill complementarity mechanism can be used to help explain rising income inequality in
Sweden. This will be done by applying the KORV model to Swedish data.
The Swedish experience is an especially interesting test case for the KORV model.
The historical development of the Swedish university wage premium differs significantly from that of the university wage premium in the US. In particular, Sweden experienced an unprecedented drive towards wage equality between 1967 and 1983.
Differences in labor market institutions also make Sweden an excellent (albeit tough) test case for the theory and model presented in KORV. Since institutional models and explanations dominate the Swedish debate on relative wage determination, 5 our a priori belief should be that a simple, market oriented model will not be able to explain movements in the skill premium in Sweden: at least not very well.
What we find instead, is that the KORV model can account for movements in the Swedish university wage premium. The main conclusion of this study is that increased income inequality between high and low skilled workers is demand driven and is due to the presence of capital-skill complementarity in production. Increased investments in new, more efficient capital equipment, together with a slowdown in the growth rate of skilled labor, have raised the ratio of effective capital inputs per skilled worker, which, in turn, has increased the relative demand (and market return) for skilled labor through the capital-skill complementarity mechanism. 6 Rising wage inequality between high and low skilled workers has received considerable attention in the Anglo-American literature. Notable studies include Bound 4 Griliches (1969) formalized the idea of capital-skill complementarity and showed it to be a key feature of modern production technology. 5 See e.g. Flam (1987) , Edin and Holmlund (1995) , Hibbs and Locking (1996) , Edin and Topel (1997), Arai and Kjellström (1999) , Lindquist (forthcoming). 6 This finding is similar to Hansson's (2000) conclusion that the accumulation of physical and knowledge capital increased the demand for skilled labor in Swedish manufacturing during the late 1980's and early 1990's.
and Johnson (1992), Katz and Murphy (1992) and, more recently, KORV. In contrast, the Swedish (and continental European) debate has paid less attention to rising wage inequality and focused more on the large drop in demand for low skilled workers and subsequent unemployment among the low skilled (see e.g. Nickell and Bell, 1995; and for Sweden, see e.g. Mellander, 1999; Hansson, 2000; Anderton et al. 2002) . The arguments and explanations within this debate are very similar to those found in the Anglo-American literature.
These explanations can be placed into three (not necessarily exclusive) categories; supply effects, demand effects and institutional effects. Institutional effects include a fall in the union wage premium and changes in wage-bargaining frameworks. Supply effects include both changes in the quantity of skilled labor and in (unobservable) labor quality. 7 Demand effects are attributed to increasing trade with low wage countries (which includes outsourcing of low-skilled production tasks) 8 and to skillbiased technological change. 9 The KORV model used in this paper provides us with a specific, economic interpretation of skill-biased technological change, as well as a hypothesis which can be tested using observable factor quantities and prices. KORV argue that the residual trend in labor productivity used by many authors to explain the increase in the skill premium is, in fact, a proxy for the omitted capital-skill complementarity variable. 10 The remainder of this study is outlined as follows. The KORV model is presented in Section 2. Then, in Section 3, the Swedish data are examined in the light of this model. This initial examination shows us that the data are consistent with the 7 For Sweden, see Edin and Holmlund (1995) and Mellander (1999) . 8 For empirical studies using Swedish data, see e.g. Hansson (2000) and Anderton et al. (2002) . For a multi-sector, small open economy model see De Santis (2002 Santis ( , 2003 . 9 For Sweden, see Mellander (1999) , Hansson (2000) and Anderton et al. (2002) . 10 Bound and Johnson (1992) evaluate the evidence concerning the impact of these different effects on the wage-structure in the United States during the 1980's. Their analysis, "points strongly to the conclusion that the principal reason for the increase in wage differentials by educational attainment and the decrease in the gender differential is a combination of skilled-labor-biased technological change and changes in unmeasured labor quality." Katz and Murphy (1992) report similar results. As such, the leading explanations of growth in the skill premium in the United States during the 1980's and '90's have relied upon a residual trend in labor productivity, which has been labeled as either skilled-biased technological change or as increases in unmeasured labor quality.
capital-skill complementarity hypothesis.
The quantitative analysis and results are presented in Section 4. First, the full econometric model is presented. Then, the main parameters of interest in the benchmark model are estimated using a simulated pseudo-maximum likelihood method.
These parameters are used in a decomposition experiment which demonstrates the importance of the capital-skill complementarity mechanism for explaining rising income inequality in Sweden. This is followed by two alternative experiments. The first experiment includes a trend in the relative efficiency of skilled labor. The second includes a trend in the efficiency of capital equipment. Allowing for unobservable trends improves the fit of the model and delivers some interesting results. It does not, however, change the main conclusion which arose from the analysis of the benchmark model. Increased income inequality between high and low skilled workers is still demand driven and is due to the presence of capital-skill complementarity in production.
Section 5 concludes.
The Model
The KORV model is a two sector model of the production side of the economy. One sector produces new capital equipment, x et , and the other produces consumption goods, c t , and new capital structures, x st (1)
Both sectors have access to a common production function, G(·), which is homogeneous of degree one and use capital structures, k st , capital equipment, k et , skilled labor, s t , and unskilled labor, u t , to produce output. Both sectors have access to a common technology, a t . The equipment producing sector also has access to an equipment-specific technology, q t , which represents the embodiment of IT advancements.
Assuming perfect competition, aggregate output (in terms of consumption units)
can be written as
The evolution of capital is given by
where δ s , and δ e , are the depreciation rates for structures and equipment, respectively.
The KORV model uses a four-factor, constant returns to scale production function which is Cobb-Douglas over structures and a CES function of the three remaining factors of production
where α, µ, λ ∈ (0, 1) and σ, ρ ∈ (−∞, 1). The CES parameter weights on unskilled labor and equipment are given by µ and λ, respectively. In equilibrium, the income share of structures will be equal to the technological parameter α. The two key substitution parameters are σ and ρ. The hypothesis of capital-skill complementarity implies σ > ρ.
Labor inputs are measured in efficiency units. Skilled labor inputs are defined as s t ≡ ψ st n st h st . Unskilled labor inputs are defined as u t ≡ ψ ut n ut h ut . The number of type i workers is n it and h it is the average number of hours worked by a type i
worker. The efficiency of a unit of type i labor is given by the exogenous index ψ it .
The log of this labor efficiency index, log (ψ t ) ≡ ϕ t , is modeled as a trend stationary
where $ t ≡ { st , ut } 0 are normally distributed i.i.d. shocks to labor efficiency with mean zero and covariance matrix Ω. Each labor type has an initial level of efficiency given by {ϕ s0 , ϕ u0 } 0 ≡ ϕ 0 and the labor efficiency of each type grows at rate {γ s , γ u } 0 ≡ γ. Together, Equations 6 and 7 give us a fully specified, stochastic production function.
The skill premium in the KORV model is defined as the ratio of skilled to unskilled wages, which, under the assumption of perfect competition, is equal to the ratio of their marginal products
Equation 8 expresses the skill premium as a function of relative factor inputs. It provides us with a way of using the KORV model to understand how changes in factor inputs affect the skill premium by decomposing the skill premium into its fundamental components; the relative quantity effect, the relative efficiency effect, and the capital-skill complementarity effect.
The relative quantity (RQ) effect says that when skilled hours grow at a faster rate than unskilled hours the skill premium will fall (recall that σ < 1). This is the same as Edin and Holmlund's (1995) supply-side effect.
The relative efficiency (RE) effect depends on the sign of the substitution parameter, σ. If σ > 0, then the elasticity of substitution between the two types of labor is greater than one which means that they are substitutes for one another in the 11 The implications of this trend stationary specification and the potential consequences of alternative specifications are discussed in Ohanian, Violante, Krusell and Ríos-Rull (2000) which is a technical companion paper to KORV. production process. In this case, when the efficiency of skilled labor grows faster than that of unskilled labor, the skill premium will rise. It is this kind of (inherently unobservable) trend which Bound and Johnson (1992) and Katz and Murphy (1992) used to explain movements in the skill premium. 12 The third effect is the capital-skill complementarity (CSC) effect. If skilled labor and capital equipment are complementary factors of production, i.e. if σ > ρ, then increases in the quantity and/or quality of the one will increase the marginal productivity of the other. So, as the stock of capital increases and as the quality of new investments improves, the wage for skilled workers will ceteris paribus increase. 13 
The Data
The KORV model will be estimated using annual Swedish data from 1970 to 1999. 14 The measure of the skill premium, w st /w ut , used in this study is the university wage premium for white-collar men in mining, manufacturing and construction. This series will act as a proxy for the return to skills for all workers in the Swedish economy, since an equivalent, aggregate measure does not exist.
In Figure 1 , we see that the skill premium for male employees in Swedish industry fell by 27 percent between 1967 and 1983 and then rose by 20 percent between 1983 and 1999. Time series data from Statistics Sweden (SCB) show a similar rise for all workers during the 1990's. Using panel data, Edin and Holmlund (1995) report a fall in the university wage premium followed by a weak upturn during the mid 1980's. 15 Estimates using the Swedish Level of Living Survey (SLLS) are also relatively similar, except in 1990. 16 On the whole, the data in Figure 1 show us that the skill premium used in this paper may, in fact, be a reasonable proxy for trends in the university wage premium for all workers. k st , the number of skilled workers, n st , and the number of unskilled workers, n ut .
Average hours worked by skilled and unskilled workers, h it , fluctuate quite a bit at business cycle frequencies, but show no tendency to trend up or down between 1970 and 1999 (SCB5). Thus, the number of workers, n it , is an appropriate measure of the long-run, potential supply of both types of labor and h it will be normalized to one in the empirical analysis. Furthermore, the number of unskilled workers includes those who are unemployed as well as latent job seekers. Both equipment and structures have been deflated using the appropriate price index. 18 The prices of equipment and structures relative to consumption are shown in in the empirical analysis in this paper, the relative price index of structures is set equal to one, while q t is the relative price index for equipment shown in Figure 3 . Reexamining Equation 8 , we see that the skill premium can be affected by changes in both the ratio of unskilled to skilled labor and by changes in the ratio of capital equipment per skilled worker. If we examine the graphs of these factor input ratios in Figure 4 , we see that there has, in fact, been an increase in the relative supply of skilled labor, particularly before 1985, after which the growth in skilled labor stagnated. This would tend to support the supply-side hypothesis. But we also see a strong correlation (equal to 0.70) between the skill premium and the ratio of capital equipment per skilled worker. In Figure 4 , we see that the ratio of capital equipment per skilled worker exhibits the same two trends as the skill premium: a falling trend after 1970 and a rising trend after 1985. Thus, a preliminary examination of the raw data supports the hypothesis of capital-skill complementarity as a potentially important factor behind movements in the skill premium. 
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The Quantitative Analysis
The Econometric Model
The econometric model consists of three structural equations which are derived from the profit maximizing conditions of the firm under the assumption of perfect competition. These three equations are; the labor share equation, the wage-bill ratio equation and the no arbitrage equation
where X t ≡ {k et , k st , n st , n ut } is the vector of exogenous factor inputs, E t is the expectations operator, and φ ≡ {δ s , δ e , α, µ, λ, σ, ρ, η e , γ i , ϕ i0 , Ω} is the vector of model parameters. The parameter η e is defined below. 
, is the marginal product of capital structures. The right hand side of the equation is the date t + 1 return on investments in equipment, which also consists of two components. The first component,
the share of undepreciated capital equipment carried over from the previous period multiplied by the expected rate of change in the relative price of capital equipment.
The second component, q t a t+1 G k e ¡ ψ t+1 , X t+1 ; φ ¢ , is the marginal product of capital equipment. 19 The parameter vector φ in Equations 9-11 includes 15 parameters. Given the small sample size and the complications each additional parameter adds to the optimization routine used to estimate the model, it is appropriate to reduce the dimension of this vector. This can be done by calibrating several of the parameters 19 There are four simplifying assumptions made in this no arbitrage equation all of which are addressed thoroughly in KORV and in Ohanian, Violante, Krusell and Ríos-Rull (2000), which is a technical companion paper to KORV. First, they assume that there is no risk premium, which means that we can ignore the covariance between consumption and returns in the estimation. Second, they assume that there is equal tax treatment of the two types of capital goods. Third, they replace the expression E t (q t /q t+1 ) (1 − δ e ) with (1 − δ e ) q t /q t+1 + ε t , where ε t is the i.i.d. forecast error, which is assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero and variance η
. Fourth, they assume that a t+1 and ϕ t+1 are known when investment decisions are made. Thus, q t+1 is the only unknown.
in advance of the estimation procedure. The calibration process is discussed in detail in Appendix B. Table 1 summarizes the calibrated parameters. The remaining parameters to be estimated are {µ, λ, σ, ρ, γ i , ϕ i0 }. The benchmark model has no trend, so γ s = γ u = 0 and ϕ s0 is normalized to zero. 
Findings From the Benchmark Model
The model is estimated using a simulated pseudo-maximum likelihood method.
20
Estimates of the substitution parameters are reported in Table 2 (standard errors are in parentheses). The parameter estimates show that production is, in fact, characterized by strong capital-skill complementarity. The substitution parameter σ is positive and significantly larger than the negative substitution parameter ρ. who all found capital-skill complementarity to be present in the production process in Sweden. The elasticity of substitution between unskilled labor and capital equipment,
S uk e , is 1.40. This implies that they are substitutes for one another in the production process. The elasticity of substitution between skilled labor and capital 20 See Appendix B for details.
equipment, S ske , is 0.52, which implies that they are complementary factor inputs.
Both estimates are well within the reasonable boundaries marked out in the empirical literature reviewed in Hamermesh (1993). 1985. Thus, we can conclude that the KORV model is able to predict movements in 21 KORV report estimates of S uke = 1.67 and S ske = 0.67 for the aggregate US economy. Lindquist (2001) reports estimates of S uk e = 1.95 and S sk e = 0.73 for Swedish industry. Both KORV and Lindquist (2001) use hours worked as a measure of labor input, while this study uses the number of workers as a measure of labor inputs. The fact that the estimates in Table 2 are lower than the estimates reported by KORV and Lindquist (2001) is probably because it is easier to substitute between hours and equipment than people and equipment.
the Swedish skill premium. 22 This is done using only observable data on quantities and prices of factor inputs.
The skill premium from the benchmark model can be decomposed into its two primary components; the capital-skill complementarity (CSC) effect and the relative quantity (RQ) effect. The results of this exercise are reported in This is not to say, however, that changes in the stock of capital equipment alone are responsible for 63 percent of the changes in the skill premium. It means that changes in the ratio of capital equipment per skilled worker are responsible for 63 percent of the changes in the skill premium. There are, of course, two potential sources of changes in this ratio. A rise (fall) in investment in capital equipment will ceteris paribus raise (lower) this ratio. While a rise (fall) in the number of skilled workers will ceteris paribus lower (raise) this ratio. So, the impact of an increase in the number of skilled workers on the skill premium is twofold in this model. It has a direct, negative effect through the relative quantity effect and a, perhaps, less obvious, negative impact through the capital-skill complementarity effect. Changes in capital equipment and unskilled labor each have only one channel through which they can effect the skill premium, the capital-skill complementarity effect and the 22 The correlation between the skill premium in the data and the model skill premium is 0.73. 23 The importance of the CSC-effect is actually growing over time (see Figure 6 ).
relative quantity effect, respectively.
Each of these effects can be decomposed (exactly) into two components by setting the growth rate of one factor input to zero while allowing the other to move with the data. For example, the capital-skill complementarity effect can be decomposed into two components by first setting the growth rate of capital equipment to zero, while still allowing for growth in skilled labor. Then, set the growth rate of skilled labor to zero and allow for growth in capital equipment. A similar decomposition can be made for the relative quantity effect by first setting the growth rate of skilled labor to zero and then by setting the growth rate of unskilled labor to zero. Table 3 summarizes these results and shows us to what extent each factor input is responsible for changes in the skill premium and through which channel it affects the skill premium. On average, during the sample period from 1970 to 1999, 61 percent of the changes in the skill premium can be attributed to changes in the quantity of skilled labor. This impact on the skill premium was through two equally important channels, the capital-skill complementarity effect and the relative quantity effect. Changes in the capital stock account for 32 percent of the changes in the skill premium, while changes in the supply of unskilled labor was responsible for 7 percent of the changes in the skill premium. 
Findings From the Model With an Unobservable Trend
In order to explore the residual labor productivity hypothesis of Katz and Murphy (1992) and Bound and Johnson (1992) , the KORV model is reestimated allowing for a nonzero trend in the relative growth rate of the efficiency of skilled labor, 24 This added element improves the model fit (see Figure 7) . 25 It also improves the model's ability to explain movements in the skill premium (see the lower right panel of Figure 7 ). 26 Several important results arise from this new estimation. First, the estimates of σ and ρ are quite similar to those in the benchmark model (compare the estimates in Table 4 with those in Table 2 ). The production process is still characterized by strong capital-skill complementarity. Second, the structural estimate of g s obtained from the full model is actually negative, which tells us that the best solution to the structural model includes a decrease in the relative efficiency of skilled labor equal to 1 percent per year. This, of course, is not what Katz and Murphy (1992) or Bound 24 See Appendix B for important details concerning this estimation. 25 In particular, it improves the fit of the wage bill equation, which, in turn, is closely related to the equation for the skill premium. This is, of course, a very sensible result given that the labor share of income and the no arbitrage condition do not trend, while the wage bill does. 26 The correlation between the skill premium in the data and the model skill premium is 0.92. and Johnson (1992) had in mind. 27 One way of rationalizing this negative trend in the relative efficiency of skilled labor would be to argue that the rapid expansion of the higher education system in Sweden during this time period resulted in lower educational standards and/or the admission of lower quality students.
28 Table 4 : Parameter Estimates and Substitution Elasticities. This decline in the relative efficiency of skilled labor actually pushes the model skill premium up towards the end of the sample. This is made possible by the presence of capital-skill complementarity in the production process. When σ > ρ, 27 Running a Katz and Murphy (1992) style regression using the Swedish data results in an increase in the relative efficiency of skilled labor equal to 3.5 percent per year. But, their regression model is misspecified, since it restricts σ to be equal to ρ. 28 Arai and Kjellström (1999) suggest that the fall in the returns to schooling which occurred in Sweden during the 1970's may have been caused (at least in part) by a decrease in the quality of education due to the rapid expansion of the educational system. the relative efficiency of skilled labor has two countervailing effects on the skill premium. First, it has a direct, negative impact through the relative efficiency effect.
Second, it has an indirect, positive effect through the capital-skill complementarity effect, since it raises the stock of capital equipment per unit of skilled labor measured in efficiency units (reexamine Equation 8) . Towards the end of the sample, the CSCeffect dominates, so that the fall in the relative efficiency of skilled labor leads to a higher demand (and market return) for skilled workers.
The results of the decomposition experiment are shown in Table 5 . The inclusion of a trend in the relative efficiency of skilled labor decreases the importance of the CSC-effect and of changes in the stock of capital equipment. The cumulative impact of each of the three effects is shown in Figure 8 . Table 5 : Decomposition of Changes in the Model Skill Premium (g s < 0).
An alternative formulation of the residual labor productivity hypothesis, would be to allow for a trend in the efficiency of capital equipment. KORV and others (e.g. Gordon, 1990 ; Greenwood et al., 1997) have argued quit convincingly that advancements in investment-specific technology were responsible for the fall in the relative price of capital equipment (see Figure 3) . KORV use (and extend) Gordon's (1990) quality adjusted price series for capital equipment in order to take this fact into account.
Adding a trend in the efficiency of capital equipment to the model 29 and, then, 
In order to explore the effects of this alternative formulation of the residual labor productivity hypothesis, the benchmark model with γ s = γ u = 0 is reestimated, but this time with a trend in the efficiency of the stock of capital equipment added to the model. As shown in Table 6 , the parameter estimates are nearly identical to those found in Tables 2 and 4 . But now the unobservable trend is positive, which is more in line with Katz and Murphy (1992) and Bound and Johnson's (1992) positive trend in the demand for skilled workers. Furthermore, when there is capital-skill complementarity in production (as there is here), this formulation can be readily interpreted as skill-biased technological change.
The model fit is (for all intents and purposes) identical to the fit of the model with a trend in relative skilled efficiency shown previously in Figure 7 . Results from the new decomposition experiment are reported in Table 7 . The cumulative impact of the CSC-effect and the RQ-effect are shown in Figure 9 . In both of the models which allow for unobservable trends in skilled labor productivity, the importance of the capital-skill complementarity mechanism and the role of capital equipment is reduced (compare Tables 7 and 5 with Table 3 ). The main conclusion concerning wage inequality derived from the benchmark model, however, remains unchanged. Increased income inequality between high and low skilled workers is still demand driven and is due to the presence of capital-skill complementarity in production. This can be seen in Figures 8 and 9 .
Conclusion
The goal of this study has been to increase our understanding of the underlying mechanisms responsible for the rise in income inequality in Sweden. The main conclusion of this study is that increased income inequality between high and low skilled workers is demand driven and is due to the presence of capital-skill complementarity in production. Increased investments in new, more efficient capital equipment, together with a slowdown in the growth rate of skilled labor, have raised the ratio of effective capital inputs per skilled worker, which, in turn, has increased the relative demand (and market return) for skilled labor through the capital-skill complementarity mechanism. A clear connection between macroeconomic developments and income inequality has been established which shows that investments in capital equipment and higher education affect the structure of relative wages in Sweden.
Previous research has shown that the capital-skill complementarity mechanism illustrated in this paper can also be used successfully to help us understand increasing wage dispersion (Caselli, 1999) and the behavior of the skill premium over the business cycle (Lindquist, 2004) . Together, these and other studies, allow us to conclude that capital-skill complementarity is an important ingredient in a successful, competitive theory of relative wages and that such a theory can, in fact, help us to understand changes in the structure of relative wages. Prices indices for capital structures, capital equipment and consumption are taken from AMECO (a European Commission Database). The labor share of income is calculated using total labor costs (including taxes) and total value added (in factor prices) as reported in the Swedish National Accounts published by Statistics Sweden (SCB2, SCB3, SCB4). This method hinges on X t being strongly exogenous. Assuming that the stocks of capital equipment and capital structures are exogenous does not appear to be problematic. Current investments may be correlated with the shocks to labor productivity. But, the stock variables, themselves, move slowly over time and should not be correlated with contemporaneous shocks to labor productivity. There is, however, reason to believe that hours worked and employment are correlated with shocks to labor productivity. That is why the estimation is done using the number of skilled and unskilled workers in the economy. This is also why unemployed workers and latent job seekers are included in the measure for unskilled labor. The number of skilled and unskilled workers should more closely reflect the exogenous, long run supply of skilled and unskilled labor and are most likely not correlated with contemporaneous shocks to labor productivity. Laroque and Salanié (1989) have shown that SPML estimators, such as the ones used in this paper are free from approximation bias and that the SPML estimator is consistent and asymptotically normal (see also Gouriéroux and Monfort, 1996) .
B Econometric Appendix
Their results, however, are asymptotic and are applicable to stationary environments only. Here, we have a nonstationary environment with trends in the latent variables and in the times series for factor prices and quantities. Furthermore, the sample used here is to small to rely upon asymptotic results.
These complications have been dealt with quite thoroughly in OVKR. In this paper, they use Monte Carlo techniques to analyze the small sample properties of the SPML estimator. They find that when the latent process is trend stationary, there is very little mean and median bias in the estimated parameters of the model even when the number of simulations performed is as low as 10. Simulating the model 50 times, they find that the mean bias is essentially zero for they key curvature parameters σ and ρ. The parameter estimates in this paper are based on 500 simulations of the model.
The benchmark model was estimated following the algorithm outlined in Appendix 2 of KORV and in their technical companion paper OVKR. The only difference is that they use a two-step method in order to correct for potential endogeneity, since they are using hours worked as their measure of labor inputs. As mentioned above, this problem is avoided here by using the number of skilled and unskilled workers (i.e. the potential labor supply) instead of actual hours worked.
The parameter vector φ includes 15 parameters. Given the small sample size at hand (30 observations) it seems appropriate to try and reduce the dimension of this vector. This can be done by calibrating several of the parameters and making some simplifying assumptions. First, the depreciation rates δ s and δ e are calibrated to equal 0.05 and 0.125, respectively. These values are the same as those used by Statistics Sweden in producing the estimates of the two capital stocks used in this paper. They are also identical to those used in KORV.
The income share of structures, α, is calculated from the data as the average of the yearly income share of structures under the assumption of equal returns, i.e. where θ t is the labor share of income at time t.
The standard error of the forecast error η e is estimated as (1 − δ e ) times the standard error of the residuals of an ARM A(1, 2) model of q t+1 /q t . The estimated equation has an R 2 = 0.65 and b σ ε = 0.019. So that η e equals 0.017.
The dimensionality of φ can be reduced further by assuming that the covariance matrix Ω = η Thus, the assumption that η ω = η s = η u appears to be a reasonable one and η ω is set equal to 0.0185. The correlation coefficient of the residuals from these two forecasting equations is equal to 0.03. As such, the assumption of zero covariance between the shocks to labor efficiency appears plausible as well.
The model which allows for growth in the relative efficiency of skilled labor inputs is estimated on a grid of potential values for g s ∈ {−.10, −.09, −.08....0.08, 0.09, 0.10}, where g s is the relative growth rate of skilled labor efficiency and γ u is normalized to zero. That is, the model is estimated in its entirety for each fixed value of g s .
The results from this set of estimations can then be compared and the parameter estimates associated with the estimated model for which the three structural equations (9-11) best match the data are the maximum likelihood estimates. A similar procedure is used when allowing for a trend in the relative efficiency of capital, γ ke .
Although this estimation procedure required a finer grid. 31 See Lindquist (2001) for more information concerning the data and estimations.
